property title process

property title process

 Reflect upon your research in a paper and assess of the following areas:
1. List and explain the property title process.
2. Can the U.S. be held liable for a breach of trust with an Indian Tribe in connection with the negotiation of a mining lease, even when the U.S. has violated no specific statutory or regulatory duty established in the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938?
3. Discuss in detail actions the tribe might implement to avoid this situation in the other land disputes.
4. What is the direct or indirect connection to the larger U.S. Government case with Indians over tribal trust funds?
5. What have you learned from this case that could be applied to future professional settings?
Support your paper with minimum of five (5) resources. In addition to these specified resources, other appropriate scholarly resources, including older articles, may be included.

Length: 5-7 pages not including title and reference pages (in APA 6th edition)

Reflect upon your research in a paper and assess of the following areas:
1.	List and explain the property title process.
2.	Can the U.S. be held liable for a breach of trust with an Indian Tribe in connection with the negotiation of a mining lease, even when the U.S. has violated no specific statutory or regulatory duty established in the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938?
3.	Discuss in detail actions the tribe might implement to avoid this situation in the other land disputes.
4.	What is the direct or indirect connection to the larger U.S. Government case with Indians over tribal trust funds?
5.	What have you learned from this case that could be applied to future professional settings?
Support your paper with minimum of five (5) resources. In addition to these specified resources, other appropriate scholarly resources, including older articles, may be included.

Length: 5-7 pages not including title and reference pages.
Justice Scalia, Opinion of the Court
NOTICE:?This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports.?Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. NAVAJO NATION
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
________________________________________
[April 6, 2009]
________________________________________
    Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
    For over 15 years, the Indian Tribe known as the Navajo Nation has been pursuing a claim for money damages against the Federal Government based on an asserted breach of trust by the Secretary of the Interior in connection with his approval of amendments to a coal lease executed by the Tribe. The original lease took effect in 1964. The amendments were approved in 1987. The litigation was initiated in 1993. Six years ago, we held that “the Tribe’s claim for compensation . . . fails,” United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U. S. 488, 493 (2003) (Navajo I), but after further proceedings on remand the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit resuscitated it. 501 F. 3d 1327 (2007). Today we hold, once again, that the Tribe’s claim for compensation fails. This matter should now be regarded as closed.
I. Legal Background
    The Federal Government cannot be sued without its consent.FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 475 (1994) . Limited consent has been granted through a variety of statutes, including one colloquially referred to as the Indian Tucker Act:
    “The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction of any claim against the United States accruing after August 13, 1946, in favor of any tribe . . . whenever such claim is one arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, or Executive orders of the President, or is one which otherwise would be cognizable in the Court of Federal Claims if the claimant were not an Indian tribe, band or group.” 28 U. S. C. §1505.
The last clause refers to the (ordinary) Tucker Act, which waives immunity with respect to any claim “founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” §1491(a)(1).
    Neither the Tucker Act nor the Indian Tucker Act creates substantive rights; they are simply jurisdictional provisions that operate to waive sovereign immunity for claims premised on other sources of law (e.g., statutes or contracts). United States v.Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 400 (1976) ; United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535, 538 (1980) (Mitchell I). The other source of law need notexplicitly provide that the right or duty it creates is enforceable through a suit for damages, but it triggers liability only if it “ ‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government.’ ” Testan, supra, at 400 (quoting Eastport S. S. Corp.v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 607, 372 F. 2d 1002, 1009 (1967)); see also United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206, 218(1983) (Mitchell II); Navajo I, 537 U. S., at 503.
    As we explained in Navajo I, there are thus two hurdles that must be cleared before a tribe can invoke jurisdiction under the Indian Tucker Act. First, the tribe “must identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other duties, and allege that the Government has failed faithfully to perform those duties.” Id., at 506. “If that threshold is passed, the court must then determine whether the relevant source of substantive law ‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages sustained as a result of a breach of the duties [the governing law] impose[s].’ ” Ibid. (alteration in original). At the second stage, principles of trust law might be relevant “in drawing the inference that Congress intended damages to remedy a breach.” United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U. S. 465, 477 (2003) .
II. History of the Present Case
A. The Facts
    A comprehensive recitation of the facts can be found in Navajo I, supra, at 495–502. By way of executive summary: The Tribe occupies a large Indian reservation in the American Southwest, on which there are significant coal deposits. In 1964 the Secretary of the Interior approved a lease (Lease 8580), executed by the Tribe and the predecessor of Peabody Coal Company, allowing the company to engage in coal mining on a tract of the reservation in exchange for royalty payments to the Tribe. The term of the lease was set at “ten (10) years from the date hereof, and for so long thereafter as the substances produced are being mined by the Lessee in accordance with its terms, in paying quantities,” App. 189; it is still in effect today. The royalty rates were originally set at a maximum of 37.5 cents per ton of coal, but the lease also said that the rates were “subject to reasonable adjustment by the Secretary of the Interior” after 20 years and again “at the end of each successive ten-year period thereafter.” Id., at 194.
    The dispute in this case concerns the Tribe’s attempt to secure such an adjustment to the royalty rate after the initial 20-year period elapsed in 1984. At that point, the Tribe requested that the Secretary exercise his power to increase the royalty rate, and the Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the Navajo Area issued an opinion letter imposing a new rate of 20 percent of gross proceeds. Id., at 8–9. But Peabody filed an administrative appeal, and while it was pending the Tribe and the company reached a negotiated agreement to set a rate of 12.5 percent of gross proceeds instead. As a result, the Area Director’s decision was vacated, the administrative appeal was dismissed, and the Secretary approved the amendments to the lease.
B. This Litigation through Navajo I
    The Tribe launched the present lawsuit in 1993, claiming that the Secretary’s actions in connection with the approval of the lease amendments constituted a breach of trust. In particular, the Tribe alleged that the Secretary, following upon improper ex partecontacts with Peabody, had delayed action on Peabody’s administrative appeal in order to pressure the economically desperate Tribe to return to the bargaining table. This, the complaint charged, was in violation of the United States’ fiduciary duty to act in the Indians’ best interests. The Tribe sought $600 million in damages, invoking the Indian Tucker Act to bypass sovereign immunity.
    The Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment to the United States, concluding that “the Navajo Nation has failed to present statutory authority which can be fairly interpreted as mandating compensation for the government’s fiduciary wrongs,”Navajo Nation v. United States, 46Fed. Cl. 217, 236 (2000), and therefore could not sue under the Indian Tucker Act. The Federal Circuit reversed that ruling and held that the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA), 52 Stat. 347, 25 U. S. C. §396a et seq., among other statutes, gave the Government broad control over mineral leasing on Indian lands, thus creating a fiduciary duty enforceable through suits for monetary damages. Navajo Nation v.United States, 263 F. 3d 1325, 1330–1332 (2001). Finding that the Government had in fact violated its obligations, the Court of Appeals reinstated the suit.
    We granted certiorari, United States v. Navajo Nation, 535 U. S. 1111 (2002) , and (as described by the author of the ensuing opinion, concurring in a companion case) considered “the threshold question” presented by the Tribe’s attempt to invoke the Indian Tucker Act: “[W]hether the IMLA and its regulations impose any concrete substantive obligations, fiduciary or otherwise, on the Government,” White Mountain, supra, at 480 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). The answer was an unequivocal no.
    The relevant provision of the IMLA provided as follows:
“[U]nallotted lands within any Indian reservation or lands owned by any tribe . . . may, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, be leased for mining purposes, by authority of the tribal council or other authorized spokesmen for such Indians, for terms not to exceed ten years and as long thereafter as minerals are produced in paying quantities.” 25 U. S. C. §396a.
Another provision of the IMLA authorized the Secretary to promulgate regulations governing operations under such leases, §396d, but during the relevant period the regulations applicable to coal leases, beyond setting a minimum royalty rate of 10 cents per ton, 25 CFR §211.15(c) (1985), did not limit the Secretary’s approval authority.
    We construed the IMLA in light of its purpose: to “enhance tribal self-determination by giving Tribes, not the Government, the lead role in negotiating mining leases with third parties.”Navajo I, 537 U. S., at 508. Consistent with that goal, the IMLA gave the Secretary not a “comprehensive managerial role,” id., at 507, but only the power to approve coal leases already negotiated by Tribes. That authority did not create, expressly or otherwise, a trust duty with respect to coal leasing and so there existed no enforceable fiduciary obligations that the Tribe could sue the Government for having neglected. Id., at 507–508.
    We distinguished Mitchell II, which involved a series of statutes and regulations that gave the Federal Government “full responsibility to manage Indian resources and land for the benefit of the Indians.” 463 U. S., at 224. Title 25 U. S. C. §406(a)permitted Indians to sell timber with the consent of the Secretary of the Interior, but directed the Secretary to base his decisions on “a consideration of the needs and best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs” and enumerated specific factors to guide that decisionmaking. We understood that statute—in combination with several other provisions and the applicable regulations—to create a fiduciary duty with respect to Indian timber. Mitchell II, supra, at 219–224. But neither the IMLA nor its regulations established any analogous duties or obligations in the coal context. Navajo I,supra, at 507–508.
    Nor did the other statutes cited by the Tribe— 25 U. S. C. §399and the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982 (IMDA), 96 Stat.1938, 25 U. S. C. §2101 et seq.—help its case. Section 399 “is not part of the IMLA and [did] not govern Lease 8580,” Navajo I, 537 U. S., at 509; rather, it granted to the Secretary the power to lease Indian land on his own say-so. We therefore found it irrelevant to the question whether “the Secretary’s more limitedapproval role under the IMLA” created any enforceable duties.Ibid. And while the IMDA did set standards to govern the Secretary’s approval of other mining-related agreements, Lease 8580 “falls outside the IMDA’s domain,” ibid.; that law was accordingly beside the point.
    Having resolved that “we ha[d] no warrant from any relevant statute or regulation to conclude that [the Secretary’s] conduct implicated a duty enforceable in an action for damages under the Indian Tucker Act,” this Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s judgment in favor of the Tribe and “remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Id., at 514.
C. Proceedings on Remand
    On remand, the Tribe argued that even if its suit could not be maintained on the basis of the IMLA, the IMDA, or §399, a “network” of other statutes, treaties, and regulations could provide the basis for its claims. The Government objected that our opinion foreclosed that possibility, but the Federal Circuit disagreed and remanded for consideration of the argument in the first instance. 347 F. 3d 1327 (2003). The Court of Federal Claims, however, persisted in its original decision to dismiss the Tribe’s claim, explaining that nothing in the suggested “network” succeeded in tying “specific laws or regulatory provisions to the issue at hand,” namely, the Secretary’s approval of royalty rates in coal leases negotiated by tribes. 68Fed. Cl. 805, 811 (2005).
    Once again the Federal Circuit reversed, this time relying primarily on three statutory provisions—two sections of the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 46, 25 U. S. C. §§635(a); and one section of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U. S. C. §1300(e)—to allow the Tribe’s claim to proceed. The Court held that the Government had violated the specific duties created by those statutes, as well as “common law trust duties of care, candor, and loyalty” that arise from the comprehensive control over tribal coal that is exercised by the Government. 501 F. 3d 1327, 1346 (2007).
    Once again we granted the Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari. 554 U. S. ___ (2008).
III. Analysis
A. Threshold Matter
    The Government points to our categorical concluding language in Navajo I: “[W]e have no warrant from any relevant statute or regulation to conclude that [the Secretary’s] conduct implicated a duty enforceable in an action for damages under the Indian Tucker Act,” 537 U. S., at 514. This proves, the Government claims, that this Court definitively terminated the Tribe’s claim last time around, so that the lower court’s later resurrection of the suit was flatly inconsistent with our mandate. But, to be fair, our opinion (like the Court of Appeals decision we were reviewing,Navajo Nation, 263 F. 3d, at 1327, 1330–1331) did not analyze any statutes beyond the IMLA, the IMDA, and §399. It is thus conceivable, albeit unlikely, that some other relevant statute, though invoked by the Tribe at the outset of the litigation, might have gone unmentioned by the Federal Circuit and unanalyzed by this Court.
    So we cannot say that our mandate completely foreclosed the possibility that such a statute might allow for the Tribe to succeed on remand. What we can say, however, is that our reasoning inNavajo I—in particular, our emphasis on the need for courts to “train on specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescriptions,” 537 U. S., at 506—left no room for that result based on the sources of law that the Court of Appeals relied upon.
B. 25 U. S. C. §635(a)
    The first of the two discussed provisions of the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act of 1950—like the IMLA—permits Indians to lease reservation lands if the Secretary approves of the deal:
    “Any restricted Indian lands owned by the Navajo Tribe, members thereof, or associations of such members . . . may be leased by the Indian owners, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, for public, religious, educational, recreational, or business purposes, including the development or utilization of natural resources in connection with operations under such leases. All leases so granted shall be for a term of not to exceed twenty-five years, but may include provisions authorizing their renewal for an additional term of not to exceed twenty-five years, and shall be made under such regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary. . . . Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to repeal or affect any authority to lease restricted Indian lands conferred by or pursuant to any other provision of law.” 25 U. S. C. §635(a).
The Tribe contends that this section renders the Government liable for any breach of trust in connection with the approval of leases executed pursuant to the authority it grants. Whether or not that is so, the provision only even arguably matters if Lease 8580 was issued under its authority.
    In Navajo I we presumed, as did the parties, that the lease had been issued pursuant to the IMLA. 537 U. S., at 495. But now the Tribe has changed its tune, and contends that Lease 8580 was approved under §635(a), not under the IMLA at all. Brief for Respondent 39. The Government says otherwise. Section 635(a) permits leasing only for “public, religious, educational, recreational, or business purposes,” and the Government contends that mining is not embraced by those terms. While leases under §635(a) may provide for “the development or utilization of natural resources,” they may do so only “in connection with operations under such leases,” i.e., in connection with operations for the enumerated purposes. By contrast, mining leases were permitted and governed by the IMLA even before the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act was enacted in 1950.
    We need not decide whether the Government is correct on that point, or whether mining could ever qualify as a “business purpose” under the statute, because the Tribe’s argument suffers from a more fundamental problem. Section 635(a) authorizes leases only for terms of up to 25 years, renewable for up to another 25 years. In contrast, the IMLA allows “for terms not to exceed ten years and as long thereafter as minerals are produced in paying quantities.” 25 U. S. C. §396a. Lease 8580, mirroring the latter language, sets a term of “ten (10) years from the date hereof, and for so long thereafter as the substances produced are being mined by the Lessee in accordance with its terms, in paying quantities.” App. 189. That indefinite lease term strongly suggests that it was negotiated by the Tribe and approved by the Secretary under the powers authorized by the IMLA, not the Rehabilitation Act.
    The Tribe’s only responses to this apparently fatal defect in its argument are (1) that §635(a) expressly leaves unaffected “any authority to lease restricted Indian lands conferred by or pursuant to any other provision of law,” including the authority to lease for indefinite terms; and (2) that Stewart Udall, who served as Secretary of the Interior during the 1960’s, recently testified that “coal leasing and related development was the centerpiece of the resources development program” under the Rehabilitation Act,id., at 569.
    As to the former: That is precisely the point. Section 635(a) creates a supplemental authority for leasing Indian land; it does not displace authority granted elsewhere. But in light of the different conditions attached to the different grants, it is apparent that a particular lease must be executed and approved pursuant to a particular authorization. The saving clause in §635(a) does not allow the Tribe to mix-and-match, to combine the (allegedly) duty-creating mechanism of the Rehabilitation Act with the indefinite lease term of the IMLA. It must be one or the other, and the record persuasively demonstrates that Lease 8580 is an IMLA lease.
    As to Secretary Udall’s testimony: That is not inconsistent with our conclusion. The Interior Department may have viewed coal leasing as an important part of the program to rehabilitate the Navajo Tribe but that does not prove that Lease 8580 was issued pursuant to the supplemental leasing authority granted by the Rehabilitation Act, rather than the pre-existing leasing authority of the IMLA preserved by the Rehabilitation Act. The latter, perhaps because of its longer lease terms, was evidently preferable to the Tribe or the coal company or both.
    Because the lease in this case “falls outside” §635(a)’s “domain,” Navajo I, supra, at 509, the Tribe cannot invoke it as a source of money-mandating rights or duties.
C. 25 U. S. C. §638
    Next, the Tribe points to a second provision in the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act:
    “The Tribal Councils of the Navajo and Hopi Tribes and the Indian communities affected shall be kept informed and afforded opportunity to consider from their inception plans pertaining to the program authorized by this subchapter. In the administration of the program, the Secretary of the Interior shall consider the recommendations of the tribal councils and shall follow such recommendations whenever he deems them feasible and consistent with the objectives of this subchapter.” 25 U. S. C. §638.
In the Tribe’s view, the Secretary violated this provision by failing promptly to abide by its wishes to affirm the Area Director’s order increasing the royalty rate under Lease 8580 to a full 20 percent of gross proceeds.
    We cannot agree. The “program” twice mentioned in §638 refers back to the Act’s opening provision, which directs the Secretary to undertake “a program of basic improvements for the conservation and development of the resources of the Navajo and Hopi Indians, the more productive employment of their manpower, and the supplying of means to be used in their rehabilitation.” §631. The statute then enumerates various projects to be included in that program, and authorizes appropriation of funds (in specific amounts) for each. E.g., “Soil and water conservation and range improvement work, $10,000,000.” §631(1).
The only listed project even remotely related to this case is “[s]urveys and studies of timber, coal, mineral, and other physical and human resources.” §631(3). Of course a lease is neither a survey nor a study. To read §638 as imposing a money-mandating duty on the Secretary to follow recommendations of the Tribe as to royalty rates under coal leases executed pursuant to another Act, and to allow for the enforcement of that duty through the Indian Tucker Act, would simply be too far a stretch.
D. 30 U. S. C. §1201 et seq.
    The final statute invoked by the Tribe is the most easily dispensed with. The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), 91 Stat. 445, 30 U. S. C. §1201 et seq., is a comprehensive statute that regulates all surface coal mining operations. See generally §1202; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 268–272 (1981) . One section of the Act, §1300, deals with coal mining specifically on Indian lands, and the Tribe cites subsection (e): “With respect to leases issued after [the date of enactment of this Act], the Secretary shall include and enforce terms and conditions in addition to those required by subsections (c) and (d) of this section as may be requested by the Indian tribe in such leases.”
    According to the Tribe, this provision requires the Secretary to enforce whatever terms the Indians request with respect to coal leases. In light of the fact that the referenced subsections (c) and (d) refer exclusively to environmental protection standards, that interpretation is highly suspect. In any event, because Lease 8580 was issued in 1964—some 13 years before the date of enactment of the SMCRA—the provision is categorically inapplicable. The Federal Circuit concluded otherwise on the theory that theamendments to the lease were approved after 1977. But §1300(e) is limited to leases “issued” after that date; and even the Tribe does not contend that a lease is “issued” whenever it is amended. The SMCRA is irrelevant here.
E. Government’s “Comprehensive Control” over Coal
    The Federal Circuit’s opinion also suggested that the Government’s “comprehensive control” over coal on Indian land gives rise to fiduciary duties based on common-law trust principles. It noted that the Government had conducted surveys and studies of the Tribe’s coal resources, 501 F. 3d, at 1341; that the Interior Department imposed various requirements on coal mining operations on Indian land—regulating, for example, “signs and markers, postmining use of land, backfilling and grading, waste disposal, topsoil handling, protection of hydrologic systems, revegetation, and steep-slope mining,” id., at 1342; and that the Government in practice exercised control over the calculation of coal values and quantities for royalty purposes, even though such control was codified by regulation only after the events at issue here, id., at 1342–1343.
    The Federal Government’s liability cannot be premised on control alone. The text of the Indian Tucker Act makes clear that only claims arising under “the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, or Executive orders of the President” are cognizable (unless the claim could be brought by a non-Indian plaintiff under the ordinary Tucker Act). 28 U. S. C. §1505. InNavajo I we reiterated that the analysis must begin with “specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescriptions.” 537 U. S., at 506. If a plaintiff identifies such a prescription, and if that prescription bears the hallmarks of a “conventional fiduciary relationship,” White Mountain, 537 U. S., at 473, then trust principles (including any such principles premised on “control”) could play a role in “inferring that the trust obligation [is] enforceable by damages,” id., at 477. But that must be the second step of the analysis, not (as the Federal Circuit made it) the starting point.
    Navajo I determined that the IMLA, which governs the lease at issue here, does not create even a “ ‘limited trust relationship’ ” with respect to coal leasing. Navajo I, supra, at 508 (quotingMitchell I, 445 U. S., at 542). Since the statutes discussed in the preceding subparts, supra, at 8–13, do not apply to the lease at all, they likewise create no such relationship. Because the Tribe cannot identify a specific, applicable, trust-creating statute or regulation that the Government violated, we do not reach the question whether the trust duty was money mandating. Thus, neither the Government’s “control” over coal nor common-law trust principles matter.
*??*??*
    None of the sources of law cited by the Federal Circuit and relied upon by the Tribe provides any more sound a basis for its breach-of-trust lawsuit against the Federal Government than those we analyzed in Navajo I. This case is at an end. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to affirm the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of the Tribe’s complaint.
It is so ordered.

Operations Management 8 Problems Set

Operations Management 8 Problems Set

Question 1
a. Give two examples each of a functional product and an innovative product.

b. Characterize functional/innovative products by choosing the appropriate adjective from the last column.
Product Characteristic
Lifecycle length

Functional Product

Innovative Product

Choose From
Long/Short

Contribution margin

High/Low

Product variety

Lot/Little

Forecast errors

Large/Small

Stockout rates

High/Low

Forced end-of-season markdowns

Frequent/Rare

Order lead time

Long/Short

c. It is claimed that a supply chain has two functions: a physical function, and a market mediation function.
Explain what these terms mean.

d. Supply chains are generally of two types: physically efficient supply chains, and market responsive supply chains. What type of supply chain would be suitable for a functional product? Why?

Question 2
a. How do demand variability and lead time impact a firms inventory levels?

Consider a firm redesigning its logistics network. What are the advantages to having a small number of
centrally located (large) warehouses as opposed to a large number of decentralized (small) warehouses closer to
the end customers?
b. Combining two warehouses into one is most beneficial when the demands at the two warehouses are
negatively correlated. True or False? Explain your reasoning.
c. A firm operates both a large national DC and numerous smaller regional warehouses. Which types of
products should be stored centrally and which ones regionally?
d.

Question 3
The boardwalk on the Paradise City beach is 4 miles long with mile markers at 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 miles, There
are 100 customers at each mile marker and each customers demand for ice cream is given by the function: D =
24 4d, where d = distance between customer and nearest ice cream vendor.

0

1
A

2

3

4

B

There are two ice cream vendors (A and B) and they are currently located at mile markers 1 and 2 as shown above. 
a. Find out the demand at each vendor and total demand for the system.

b. Are these the best locations of the vendors from the systems point of view? If not, suggest better locations for the vendors. What is the total system demand now?

c. Compute how much and to whom an incentive should be offered so that the vendors relocate to the optimal locations from the systems point of view? (Assume one unit of ice cream generates $1.50 in profit.)

Question 4
RFC Bearings has just entered the U.S .market. It has three major DCs in the Atlanta, Boston, and Chicago areas.
Annual demand served by each DC is estimated to be:
Atlanta 10,000

Boston 20,000

Chicago 15,000

Four plants (Memphis, Philadelphia, Toledo) supply the DCs. Per-unit transportation costs and plant capacities are
given in the following table:
Plant
Location

Distribution
Center
Atlanta
Memphis
$3
Philadelphia
5
Toledo
6

Plant
Capacity
Boston
Chicago
9
7
2
4
6
2

30,000
35,000
35,000

Using the notation:
XMA = Qty shipped from Memphis to Atlanta
XMB = Qty shipped from Memphis to Boston, etc.,
write down a model that will determine the optimal demand allocation (i.e. minimize transportation costs.)
Suppose now that the three locations (Memphis, Philadelphia, Toledo) are potential locations, i.e., each plant
would only be constructed if it improves overall cost (i.e., transportation plus plant fixed costs). The data is
repeated here with the (annualized) plant fixed costs shown additionally.
Plant
Location

Distribution
Center
Atlanta
Memphis
$3
Philadelphia
5
Toledo
6

Plant
Capacity
Boston
Chicago
9
7
2
4
6
2

Annualized
Fixed Costs
30,000
35,000
35,000

$50,000
45,000
48,000

What changes would you make to the model in part (a) so that we can determine the optimal locations of the plants as well as the optimal demand allocation (i.e. minimize both transportation as well as fixed costs). [Do not attempt to solve this modelyou are only asked to write down the model, i.e. objective function and constraints.]

Question 5

Consider the following data pertaining to a distribution center.
Parameter
Mean Weekly Demand
Standard Deviation of Weekly Demand
Lead Time
# of weeks in year
Ordering cost:
Holding cost:
Cycle service level:
Measure

Value
100
30
2 Weeks
50
$50 /order
$4 /unit /week (This is H, not hc eq. (11.2) on p. 273 of text.)
97%
Computation

order quantity

cycle inventory

safety inventory

reorder level

annual inventory holding cost

number of orders per year

annual ordering cost

Question 6
Suppose the 100 retail stores of a supermarket chain have identical weekly demand for a product (mean 200, standard deviation 120). There is zero correlation between the retailers demands. The lead time to replenish each retail store is 4 weeks. A cycle service level of 95% is desired.

a. If each retail store maintains its own dedicated warehouse, how much safety stock is needed at each store?

b. What is the total safety stock across all stores?

It is now proposed to have a central DC servicing all 100 retailers. The lead time to replenish the DC is the
same (4 weeks). How much safety stock is needed at the DC to maintain the same cycle service level?
c. If annual inventory holding cost is $50/unit/year, how much money was saved as a result of the decrease in the safety stock?
d

Question 7
AspenWear, a retailer of ski wear needs to place an order for the Mirabelle, a designer ski jacket for the high-end market. The jacket retails for $600 and costs AspenWear $250 from a source in China. Due to fickle customer tastes, any surplus jackets at the end of the ski season cannot be carried over to the next season but must be disposed of. A bargain discounter has offered to buy these jackets at $150 each (and plans to mark them up to $300). Also, because of the long lead times involved in sourcing from China, there is realistically only one opportunity to place an order during each season (in November of each year so that the jackets will be ready by the following August). From past history, AspenWear believes that demand for the Mirabelle can be represented by a normal distribution with mean 6000 and standard deviation 3600. Their current ordering rule is as follows: Order Quantity = Mean Demand + (1/3)*(Standard Deviation) 
a. Compute the order quantity that will maximize AspenWears expected profit.
b. Compare the two quantities (the one computed above plus the current rule) in terms of the following
performance measures: expected sales, expected profit, expected overstock, and fill rate. (It would be helpful if you display your results in a 2 x 4 table2 quantities, 4 performance measures.)

Question 8
A movie studio sells the latest movie on DVD to Blockbuster at $10 per DVD. The marginal production cost
for the movie studio is $2 per DVD. Blockbuster prices each DVD at $25 to its customers. DVD s are kept on
the regular rack for a one-month period, after which they are discounted down to $3. Blockbuster places a
single order for DVDs. Their current forecast is that sales will be normally distributed, with a mean of 50,000
and a standard deviation of 30,000.
a. How many DVDs should Blockbuster order? What is its expected profit?
b. What is the profit that the studio makes given Blockbusters actions?
c. The studio is offering Blockbuster a deal: They will sell the DVD to blockbuster at $5 each in return for a
65-35 split of the revenue (65% to Blockbuster). Should Blockbuster agree to this deal?

Use algebra to derive

Use algebra to derive

Use algebra to derive (i.e. show how one equation follows from the other), from national income account identities, the simple classical S=I model elaborated in Chapter 3 of Mishkin, using three assumptions: closed economy, small open economy, and large economy.  Use three graphs, one for each case, suitably labelled, to explain how the economy might react to a decrease in the autonomous demand for investment.   What will happen, in each case, to interest rates, GDP, I and S, and NX?

Who do you think bears responsibility for this tragedy?

Who do you think bears responsibility for this tragedy?

Read:  The Dhaka Factory Fire: Who is Responsible?
http://www.scu.edu/ethics-center/ethicsblog/globaldialog.cfm?b=180&c=15006

With reference to the assigned reading, and in light of some of the responses of Western manufacturers and retailers who profit from operations in Bangladesh (Google recent articles) , consider the questions at the end of the article, i.e.,
 
Who do you think bears responsibility for this tragedy? What other ethical frameworks (social, political, etc…) can help unpack this complicated scenario? How would you use these other frameworks to decide who is responsible? 

Trident MGT491 Module 1 Case Assignment

Trident MGT491 Module 1 Case Assignment

MGT491 Module 1 Case Assignments on

Strategic Importance of Human Resource Management

For the case assignment, read all of the required readings listed on the background page.

Assignment Expectations:

Please respond to the issues raised below in a 3-4 page report, not including cover and reference pages. Be sure to draw upon and integrate concepts from all of the module required background materials, other materials you might find on the web, and your previous course material (e.g., Mgt 407, Mgt 411, Mgt 412):

Imagine you have just been hired as the CEO of a mid-sized firm, and the current HR department is limited to payroll, benefits, recruiting, training, performance management, and safety. The current HR manager reports to the VP of Operations. Given this information and that provided in the background readings, create a blueprint for redesigning the HR function as a critically important strategic partner in the future of the organization.

Submit your report to CourseNet by the Module due date.

corresponding questions

corresponding questions

When answering the corresponding questions, make sure to use your textbook to guide you in framing your answers, and make sure to use proper attribution with the author's name and page number (use proper APA citation to do this). Answering each question requires you to provide an in depth reflection of your experiences, your knowledge and your skills. Answering each question also requires you to question and analyze your professionalism in the field.
Grammar and Spelling: Proper grammar and spelling matter here, as well as your ability to synthesize information in a way that your teacher can understand, as well as your peers.
Positioning Your Answers: Remember, although all of your fellow students in the class are business professionals, not all business professionals have the same knowledge or skill set. Make sure to position your answers in a clear and concise way for ALL to understand. Each question should require you to answer in no less than 300 words and no more then 400 words

Topic:
Discuss the challenges international marketers face when selling through the Internet.

Time Value of Money

Time Value of Money

Time Value of Money - A nswer the following questions:

1. If you place $100 in a savings account today, what will be the value of the account in 5 years if the bank is paying 6% interest?

2. You hold $2,000 as a customer deposit, but the customer wants to make sure he does not loose on the opportunity cost of those dollars. You agree to pay the customer 10% interest during the holding period. At the end of 3 years you need to return the deposit and the interest to the customer. How much will you have to give the customer in 3 years?

3. If you deposit money today into an account which pays 8% interest, how long will it take for you money to double?

4. Your parents are planning to retire in 18 years. They currently have $250,000. They supplement those dollars with an annual payment into a retirement account of $20,000. What will be the value of all dollars if the funds can earn an interest rate of 5%? What will be the value of all dollars if the funds can earn an interest rate of 10%?

5. What is the present value of a security which promises to pay you $5,000 in 20 years? Assuming you can earn 7% interest.

6. What is the future value of a 5-year ordinary annuity which promises to pay you $300 each year? The rate of interest is 9%.

7. An investment pays you $100 at the end of each of the next 3 years. The investment will then pay you $200 at the end of Year 4, $300 at the end of year 5, and $500 at the end of year 6. If the rate of interest earned on the investment is 8%, what is the present value of this investment? What is its future value?

8. You are serving on a jury. A plaintiff is suing the city for injuries sustained after falling down an uncovered manhole. In the trial, the doctor testified that it will be 5 years before the plaintiff is able to return to work. The jury has already decided in favor of the plaintiff. You are the foreman of the jury and propose that the jury gives the plaintiff an award to cover the following items:

a) The present value of 2 years of back-pay ($34,000 and $36,000). 

b) The present value of 5 years of future salary. Assume that the salary would increase at a rate of 3 percent a year. 

c) $100,000 for pain and suffering

d) $20,000 for court costs

e) Assume an interest rate of 7%. What should be the size of the settlement?